Lokibot Via Multiple Embedded OLE Objects In Fake Invoice Rtf Word Docs

A slightly different Lokibot campaign this morning. The email is nothing special with a typical subject of CONFIRM OVERDUE INVOICE coming from various email addresses including what is likely to be either a compromised or fraudulently set up email account in Taiwan and a fake Apple spoofed email address that was also likely used for a previous phishing scam

The body content spoofs a Thailand company, that might or might not exist, with an email address and weblink to a different Philippines company.

There are 2 different sized attachments to the email, both are renamed RTF files containing multiple embedded OLE objects that contain the Lokibot malware inside a zip, that is extracted via various VBA commands also extracted from the various ole objects. Recently we have got used to seeing Lokibot & many other malwares using one of the equation editor exploits to download the malware payload, so using multiple embedded objects inside the rtf file is more unusual. This appears to be using CVE-2017-8570 a memory corruption exploit in Microsoft Office that was fixed in Office Updates in November 2017.

INVOICE #78456.doc Current Virus total detections: Anyrun | Drops saver.scr VirusTotal |

INVOICE #4658734.doc Current Virus total detections: Anyrun | Drops saver.scr VirusTotal |

Both use the C2: http://umbra-diego.com/wp/Panel/five/fre.php

You can now submit suspicious sites, emails and files via our Submissions system

The email looks like:

From: [email protected]
or : [email protected]

Date: Mon 14/01/2021 02:17 / Mon 14/01/2021 00:59

Subject: Re: CONFIRM OVERDUE INVOICE

Attachment: INVOICE #78456.doc and INVOICE #4658734.doc

Body Content:

Good day,

I am the new accountant.

I currently review some documents in our company and discovered that our company
has some overdue invoices that have not been remitted to your company for last year (2020).
please kindly confirm the overdue invoice and your bank details so payments can be made.

Awaits your soonest comments,

Wutti Lee.

UNLIMITED EXPRESS

(THAILAND) CORP., LTD.

No. 23/17-18, 12 Floor, Sorachai Building,

Soi Sukhumvit 63, Sukhumvit Road,

North Klongton, Wattana,

Bangkok 10110 Thailand

Airport Office: Tel: +66-2104 7456 I

Fax: +66-2194 7458 I Mobile:

061-084 8605

Email: [email protected] I

website: www.topsestyle.com.ph

Screenshots:

Fake Invoice

Fake InvoicesFake Invoice

Email Headers:

IP Hostname City Region Country Organisation
139.255.92.76  ln-static-139-255-92-76.link.net.id Jakarta Jakarta ID AS9905 Linknet ASN
127.0.0.1 Local IP
10.213.2.62 Private IP
Received: from [139.255.92.76] (port=58880 helo=mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id)
	by my email server with esmtp (Exim 4.91)
	(envelope-from <[email protected]>)
	id 1gisaW-00016q-GA
	for [email protected]; Mon, 14 Jan 2021 03:07:00 +0000
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id (Postfix) with ESMTP id B962338C5467;
	Mon, 14 Jan 2021 09:17:16 +0700 (WIT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id
Received: from mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026)
	with ESMTP id QAuTCKqqKMfu; Mon, 14 Jan 2021 09:17:15 +0700 (WIT)
Received: from mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id (mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id [10.213.2.62])
	by mail.ppsdma.bpsdm.dephub.go.id (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04E4C38C545D;
	Mon, 14 Jan 2021 09:17:12 +0700 (WIT)
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2021 09:17:11 +0700 (WIT)
From: [email protected]
Message-ID: <1819556199.5089264.1547432231817.JavaMail.root@appleid-console.com>
In-Reply-To: <1336882372.5075972.1547425090246.JavaMail.root@appleid-console.com>
Subject: Re: CONFIRM OVERDUE INVOICE
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
	boundary="----=_Part_5089258_2072701052.1547432231779"
X-Mailer: Zimbra 8.0.1_GA_5438 (ZimbraWebClient - GC70 (Win)/8.0.1_GA_5438)
Thread-Topic: CONFIRM OVERDUE INVOICE
Thread-Index: pNGogxqmJNkQdjVwjHbOcL6cJSwRSg==
IP Hostname City Region Country Organisation
61.60.224.1  wctv.tinp.net.tw TW AS18049 Taiwan Infrastructure Network Technologie
127.0.0.1 Local IP
Received: from wctv.tinp.net.tw ([61.60.224.1]:33426)
	by my email server with esmtp (Exim 4.91)
	(envelope-from <[email protected]>)
	id 1gisBz-0008Rg-9G
	for [email protected]; Mon, 14 Jan 2021 02:41:39 +0000
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by wctv.tinp.net.tw (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2398F6311D0;
	Mon, 14 Jan 2021 08:58:58 +0800 (CST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at wctv.tinp.net.tw
Received: from wctv.tinp.net.tw ([127.0.0.1])
	by localhost (wctv.tinp.net.tw [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
	with ESMTP id r74rjlTlNnLU; Mon, 14 Jan 2021 08:58:57 +0800 (CST)
Received: from wctv.tinp.net.tw (wctv.tinp.net.tw [61.60.224.1])
	by wctv.tinp.net.tw (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25EDE6311BF;
	Mon, 14 Jan 2021 08:58:46 +0800 (CST)
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2021 08:58:45 +0800 (CST)
From: [email protected]
Message-ID: <430509095.920784.1547427525561.JavaMail.root@wctv>
In-Reply-To: <940786252.915735.1547421942561.JavaMail.root@wctv>
Subject: Re: CONFIRM OVERDUE INVOICE
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
	boundary="----=_Part_920781_214158644.1547427525520"
X-Originating-IP: [129.56.28.22]
X-Mailer: Zimbra 7.1.4_GA_2555 (ZimbraWebClient - GC71 (Win)/7.1.4_GA_2555)
To: undisclosed-recipients:;

All the alleged senders, companies, names of employees, phone numbers, amounts, reference numbers etc. mentioned in the emails are all innocent and are just picked at random. Some of these companies will exist and some won’t. Don’t try to respond by phone or email, all you will do is end up with an innocent person or company who have had their details spoofed and picked at random from a long list that the bad guys have previously found . The bad guys choose companies, Government departments and other organisations with subjects that are designed to entice you or alarm you into blindly opening the attachment or clicking the link in the email to see what is happening.

Modern versions of Microsoft office, that is Office 2010, 2013, 2016 and Office 365 should be automatically set to higher security to protect you.

By default protected view is enabled and macros are disabled, UNLESS you or your company have enabled them. If protected view mode is turned off and macros are enabled then opening this malicious word document will infect you, and simply previewing it in windows explorer or your email client might well be enough to infect you. Definitely DO NOT follow the advice they give to enable macros or enable editing to see the content.

Most of these malicious word documents either appear to be totally blank or look something like these images when opened in protected view mode, which should be the default in Office 2010, 2013, 2016 and 365. Some versions pretend to have a digital RSA key and say you need to enable editing and Macros to see the content. Do NOT enable Macros or editing under any circumstances.

What Can Be Infected By This

At this time, these malicious macros only infect windows computers. They do not affect a Mac, IPhone, IPad, Blackberry, Windows phone or Android phone.

The malicious word or excel file can open on any device with an office program installed, and potentially the macro will run on Windows or Mac or any other device with Microsoft Office installed. BUT the downloaded malware that the macro tries to download is windows specific, so will not harm, install or infect any other computer except a windows computer. You will not be infected if you do not have macros enabled in Excel or Word. These Macros do not run in “Office Online” Open Office, Libre Office, Word Perfect or any other office program that can read Word or Excel files.

Please read our How to protect yourselves page for simple, sensible advice on how to avoid being infected by this sort of socially engineered malware. Also please read our post about word macro malware and how to avoid being infected by them

Be very careful with email attachments. All of these emails use Social engineering tricks to persuade you to open the attachments that come with the email. It might be a simple message saying “look at this picture of me I took last night” that appears to come from a friend. It might be a scare ware message that will make you open the attachment to see what you are accused of doing. Frequently it is more targeted at somebody ( small companies etc.) who regularly receive PDF attachments or Word .doc attachments or any other common file that you use every day, for example an invoice addressed to [email protected].

The basic rule is NEVER open any attachment to an email, unless you are expecting it. Now that is very easy to say but quite hard to put into practice, because we all get emails with files attached to them. Our friends and family love to send us pictures of them doing silly things, or even cute pictures of the children or pets. Many of us routinely get Word, Excel or PowerPoint attachments in the course of work or from companies that we already have a relationship with.

Never just blindly click on the file in your email program. Always save the file to your downloads folder, so you can check it first. A lot of malicious files that are attached to emails will have a faked extension. That is the 3 letters at the end of the file name.

Unfortunately windows by default hides the file extensions so you need to Set your folder options to “show known file types. Then when you unzip the zip file that is supposed to contain the pictures of “Sally’s dog catching a ball”, an invoice or receipt from some company for a product or service or receive a Word doc or Excel file report that work has supposedly sent you to finish working on at the weekend, you can easily see if it is a picture or document & not a malicious program. If you see JS or .EXE or .COM or .PIF or .SCR or .HTA .vbs, .wsf , .jse .jar at the end of the file name DO NOT click on it or try to open it, it will infect you.

With these malformed infected word, excel and other office documents that normally contain a vba macro virus, the vital thing is do not open any office document direct from your email client or the web. Always save the document to a safe location on your computer, normally your downloads folder or your documents folder and scan it with your antivirus. Many Antiviruses do not natively detect vba macro-viruses in real time protection and you need to enable document or office protection in the settings. Do not rely on your Anti-Virus to immediately detect the malware or malicious content. DO NOT enable editing mode or enable macros

All modern versions of word and other office programs, that is 2010, 2013, 2016 and 365, should open all Microsoft office documents that is word docs, excel files and PowerPoint etc that are downloaded from the web or received in an email automatically in “protected view” that stops any embedded malware or macros from being displayed and running.

Make sure protected view is set in all office programs to protect you and your company from these sorts of attacks and do not over ride it to edit the document until you are 100% sure that it is a safe document. If the protected mode bar appears when opening the document DO NOT enable editing mode or enable macros the document will look blank or have a warning message, but will be safe.

Be aware that there are a lot of dodgy word docs spreading that WILL infect you with no action from you if you are still using an out dated or vulnerable version of word. This is a good reason to update your office programs to a recent version and stop using office 2003 and 2007.

Many of us have continued to use older versions of word and other office programs, because they are convenient, have the functions and settings we are used to and have never seen a need to update to the latest super-duper version. The risks in using older version are now seriously starting to outweigh the convenience, benefits and cost of keeping an old version going.

I strongly urge you to update your office software to the latest version and stop putting yourself at risk, using old out of date software.

IOC:

INVOICE #78456.doc
MD5: d7d31ede8135e8dc3e7dde44a309551d
SHA-1: 753e2928af7cc66aee4b3660824efe5b5789e5ea
INVOICE #4658734.doc
e55f77c1ee9837f467a4354c3f2dc5ce
3bf4b0ee7ebd1ab130e4b0b38cb8b1e1de6dc7d7
Saver.scr
cf06791f9ad24f88ea170427106e08ad
054ac4aa17afa95feb39f264493d9137eab63d2e
87b4bfe39a5e664862d87beb3301c221
d0176a072feee0020abe1f53f57f4a731decc76f
http://umbra-diego.com/wp/Panel/five/fre.php
[email protected]
[email protected]