The start to another week with several different malspam emails arriving overnight to start off Monday Morning with a bang. They are all typical subjects & email content and all deliver various well known malware, using a variety of exotic compressed (zip) files, many of which don’t natively extract on windows without special tools. Well 3 out of 4 emails do deliver malware. The odd one was a payment confirmation email that contained what looks like a totally blank PDF file.
-  Kevin Ngugen <firstname.lastname@example.org> Purchase Order #55483300032 with a broken .rar attachment Delivering Hawkeye Keylogger
-  Katrinch Suresh <email@example.com> RFQ-475833-KETTIS GROUP PVT Also delivering the same Hawkeye Keylogger as 
-  Maria <firstname.lastname@example.org> Attached* Sample PO_000#02019//Confirmation Delivering Pony/Fareit
-  Cheng Huang <email@example.com> Payment Confirmation. Delivering an apparently empty blank PDF with no obvious malicious content. Either the criminal has messed up with this one and forgotten to insert a link to the malware or it is a new exploit in Adobe reader that doesn’t run on a sandbox. I don’t know enough about examining PDF files to be able to determine what it is. My gut feeling is that they have probably messed up, but there are some sections of the PDF when examined in a hex editor that might be suspicious.
They use email addresses and subjects that will entice a user to read the email and open the attachment. A very high proportion are being targeted at small and medium size businesses, with the hope of getting a better response than they do from consumers.
You can now submit suspicious sites, emails and files via our Submissions system
 Purchase Order #55483300032.pdf.r00 Extracts to: Purchase Order #55483300032.exe Current Virus total detections: Anyrun |  RFQ-475833-KETTIS GROUP PVT.pdf.gz extracts to RFQ-475833-KETTIS GROUP PVT.exe VirusTotal | Anyrun |  Company_Profile.ace extracts to Swift_Copy_usdpayments.exe ( and Purchase orders.ace extracts to Purchase orders.exe ) VirusTotal | Anyrun | The C2 is http://meshfabricspad.com/%7Ezadmin/pmark/os/info.php  Screen_shot_payment_67137.rar Extracts to Screen_shot_payment_67137.pdf VirusTotal | Anyrun |
 From: Kevin Ngugen <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Sun 03/02/2019 22:21
Subject: Purchase Order #55483300032
Attachment: Purchase Order #55483300032.pdf.r00
Dear Valued Vendor,
Please find the attached PO and provide us with your signed acknowledgment in the same PO form within 3 working days.
Waiting urgently for your prompt reply.
SR. PURCHASE | PURCHASING
Bang Pa-In Industrial Estate (I-EA-T Free Zone), 605-606 Moo 2, Klongjig, Bang Pa-In
Ayutthaya 13160, Thailand
T. +66 (0)35 258-555, ext.153
F. +66 (0)35 258 130
M. +66 (0)817 801 252
 From: Katrinch Suresh <email@example.com>
Date: Sun 03/02/2019 22:53
Subject: RFQ-475833-KETTIS GROUP PVT
Attachment: RFQ-475833-KETTIS GROUP PVT.pdf.gz
Good day to you
Kindly find the enclosed inquiry for quotation & acknowledge receipt of this email.
KETTIS GROUP PVT.
113/5, Swastik Regalia, kavesar,
Thane (W), Maharashtra, India.
Office Tel. : +912225971040
Cell No. : +919619160023
 From: Maria <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Date: Mon 04/02/2019 03:37
Subject: Attached* Sample PO_000#02019//Confirmation
Attachment: Company_Profile.ace and Purchase orders.ace
Good day my friend
I hope you are doing fine?
Please see Attach the product samples which we want to purchase for your company, kindly check all the details especially the ones marked in yellow and give us your quick reply so that we can finalize the order Asap
Thank you and
TBG Group Intl.
 From: Cheng Huang <email@example.com>
Date: Mon 04/02/2019 03:20
Subject: Payment Confirmation.
Our financier has facilitated the payment as agreed, attached is the payment confirmation receipt . Please get back to me once you confirm payment.
Cheng N. Lui
These malicious attachments normally have a password stealing component, with the aim of stealing your bank, PayPal or other financial details along with your email or FTP ( web space) log in credentials. Many of them are also designed to specifically steal your Facebook and other social network log in details. A very high proportion are Ransomware versions that encrypt your files and demand money ( about £350/$400) to recover the files.All the alleged senders, amounts, reference numbers, Bank codes, companies, names of employees, employee positions, email addresses and phone numbers mentioned in the emails are all random. Some of these companies will exist and some won’t. Don’t try to respond by phone or email, all you will do is end up with an innocent person or company who have had their details spoofed and picked at random from a long list that the bad guys have previously found. The bad guys choose companies, Government departments and organisations with subjects that are designed to entice you or alarm you into blindly opening the attachment or clicking the link in the email to see what is happening.
Please read our How to protect yourselves page for simple, sensible advice on how to avoid being infected by this sort of socially engineered malware.
This is another one of the files that unless you have “show known file extensions enabled“, can easily be mistaken for a genuine DOC / PDF / JPG or other common file instead of the .EXE / .JS file it really is, so making it much more likely for you to accidentally open it and be infected.
Be very careful with email attachments. All of these emails use Social engineering tricks to persuade you to open the attachments that come with the email. Whether it is a message saying “look at this picture of me I took last night” and it appears to come from a friend or is more targeted at somebody who regularly is likely to receive PDF attachments or Word .doc attachments or any other common file that you use every day.
The basic rule is NEVER open any attachment to an email, unless you are expecting it. Now that is very easy to say but quite hard to put into practice, because we all get emails with files attached to them. Our friends and family love to send us pictures of them doing silly things, or even cute pictures of the children or pets.
Never just blindly click on the file in your email program. Always save the file to your downloads folder, so you can check it first. Many malicious files that are attached to emails will have a faked extension. That is the 3 letters at the end of the file name. Unfortunately windows by default hides the file extensions so you need to Set your folder options to “show known file types. Then when you unzip the zip file that is supposed to contain the pictures of “Sally’s dog catching a ball” or a report in word document format that work has supposedly sent you to finish working on at the weekend, or an invoice or order confirmation from some company, you can easily see if it is a picture or document & not a malicious program.
If you see JS or .EXE or .COM or .PIF or .SCR or .HTA .vbs, .wsf , .jse .jar at the end of the file name DO NOT click on it or try to open it, it will infect you.
While the malicious program is inside the zip file, it cannot harm you or automatically run. When it is just sitting unzipped in your downloads folder it won’t infect you, provided you don’t click it to run it. Just delete the zip and any extracted file and everything will be OK. You can always run a scan with your antivirus to be sure. There are some zip files that can be configured by the bad guys to automatically run the malware file when you double click the zip to extract the file. If you right click any suspicious zip file received, and select extract here or extract to folder ( after saving the zip to a folder on the computer) that risk is virtually eliminated. Never attempt to open a zip directly from your email, that is a guaranteed way to get infected. The best way is to just delete the unexpected zip and not risk any infection.
Main object- “Purchase orders.exe”
Dropped executable file
sha256 C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\nsa76B7.tmp\System.dll a0cac4cf4852895619bc7743ebeb89f9e4927ccdb9e66b1bcd92a4136d0f9c77
sha256 C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\provenances.dll a6a8b72ceef230927b69f48ddf93768cec165aea8c828fbe2b6606dda04bbc14
Main object- “RFQ-475833-KETTIS GROUP PVT.exe”
Main object- “Screen_shot_payment_67137.pdf”
Dropped executable file
sha256 C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\S\288\AdobeARM.msi 22831a2a10c7357a97995f93060d35a256075e91a83cd5afe0794a509fe0df8e
sha256 C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\S\288\AdobeARMHelper.exe 00b428aabc9c9229d97ebaedaab68cf2e1c0466abe84d5b495e17c254bdddb00