WE still see loads of AgentTesla keylogger/ Info-stealer malware campaigns hitting the UK most days. Today is no exception with quite a few so far. I don’t always post them here, unless there is something slightly different or unusual about either the delivery method or the malware itself changes. I just submit to Antivirus companies & most times tweet the details to other security researchers. This version is noteworthy because the Exfil / C2 is an Iraq government site which “should” be 100% secure but obviously isn’t.
The email is the usual junk email that should be blocked by most spam filters, which pretends to be a purchase order. The attachment is an ISO file which many Antivirus or mailscanners / perimeter defences do not routinely scan and wait for the executable file inside to be exposed before scanning that. Both are pretty badly detected on Virustotal and are relying on generic detections for the autoit programming language, rather than any actual malware detections.
Official_Purchase Order.exe VirusTotal |
The C2 / Exfil site is mail.cosqc.gov.iq ( which is another compromised site) via smtp Because the criminals are using SMTP port 587 and Start TLS which encrypts the email addresses as well as the contents, I cannot easily determine which email addresses are being used for C2 / Exfil. The domain cosqc.gov.iq is hosted by Hostgator on a shared server gator4229.hostgator.com which is not really an adequate secure service for ANY Government department even from a country in such turmoil as Iraq.
You can now submit suspicious sites, emails and files via our Submissions system
As far as I can tell afdsola.com has not been hacked or had their email or other servers compromised. They are not sending the emails to you. They are just “innocent” victims in exactly the same way as every recipient of these emails.
One of the emails looks like:
Date: Tue 08/10/2019 02:03
Subject: FW: Purchase Order – PO. 4029530
Attachment: Official_Purchase Order.iso
We received your quotation/offer in July through my colleague.
Find attached herewith our Official purchase order (PO.4029530).
Kindly confirm receipt and return with order confirmation and proforma invoice.
We hope for a good partnership with you.
We can accept 50% prepayment for the order compared to the 100% required in your quotation.
Waiting for your kind reply.
A: EDIFICIO FAXFORM
Avda. Elche 183, Esc. B – 2ºD, 03008 Alicante, Spain
P: +34 965 103 807
M: +34 629 355 297
The content of this e-mail is confidential and intended solely for the use of the addressee. The text of this email (including any attachments) may contain information which is proprietary and or confidential or privileged in nature belonging to LOGUSS THE FASHION MANTRA and or its associates group companies subsidiaries . If you are not the addressee or the person responsible for delivering it to the addressee any disclosure copying distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on it is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error please notify the sender and remove this communication entirely from your system. The recipient acknowledges that no guarantee or any warranty is given as to completeness and accuracy of the content of the email. The recipient further acknowledges that the views contained in the email message are those of the sender and may not necessarily reflect those of LOGUSS THE FASHION MANTRA. Before opening and accessing the attachment please check and scan for virus. WARNING: Computer viruses can be transmitted via email. The recipient should check this email and any attachments for the presence of viruses. The company accepts no liability for any damage caused by any virus transmitted by this email.
Email headers & delivery records:
Received: from server.buddiestechnologies.in ([126.96.36.199]:52816) by knight.knighthosting.co.uk with esmtps (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from <email@example.com>) id 1iHdya-00057y-Ul for firstname.lastname@example.org; Tue, 08 Oct 2019 02:07:52 +0100 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=buddiesholidays.in; s=default; h=Message-ID:Reply-To:Subject:To:From:Date: Content-Type:MIME-Version:Sender:Cc:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID: Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc :Resent-Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=q9vubTe1GkdEKj8Sw2YEe9lc268VhGCshF8ZTAzRf2Q=; b=SCWHcvZNW+fcvZHM6XHzAIrkLf rOXncRH912LAIoGMJUAyn0bHRcpOIUZIpHni++Izpea6c3k8+ZMSS+bN7UA8wYuyCr4EqXQ2xVNUf uYsNW/u2z0wINMoTxae7S6DKBiKK4ZZZAekYtH679QelijjfNlUpVTdlFwjZ3WSYgQWxQ244RqrqB o9AhKxaRnst2rjmD+X7UFii77fSkePwUgCGwQCLoX13kOxdvOLkZzurftjx1LCT2rql38sPVMyxHA 6CmNavwqeeGXmXUd4W2dyJsLlZsX0UWXYr7nb4LkgquiHysJIxyMpPrcJsGkV0MYglbtbb6baBj+y XiGrz4KA==; Received: from [::1] (port=45712 helo=server.buddiestechnologies.in) by server.buddiestechnologies.in with esmtpa (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from <email@example.com>) id 1iHduC-0006Oy-17; Tue, 08 Oct 2019 06:33:12 +0530 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_8be23dadc0ef931bb65df3896dbc4400" Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2019 06:33:11 +0530 From: firstname.lastname@example.org To: undisclosed-recipients:; Subject: FW: Purchase Order - PO. 4029530 Reply-To: email@example.com Mail-Reply-To: firstname.lastname@example.org Message-ID: <email@example.com> X-Sender: firstname.lastname@example.org User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.3.8 X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - server.buddiestechnologies.in X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - myonlinesecurity.co.uk X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - afdsola.com X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: server.buddiestechnologies.in: authenticated_id: email@example.com X-Authenticated-Sender: server.buddiestechnologies.in: firstname.lastname@example.org X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir:
These malicious attachments normally have a password stealing component, with the aim of stealing your bank, PayPal or other financial details along with your email or FTP ( web space) log in credentials. Many of them are also designed to specifically steal your Facebook and other social network log in details. A very high proportion are Ransomware versions that encrypt your files and demand money ( about £350/$400) to recover the files.All the alleged senders, amounts, reference numbers, Bank codes, companies, names of employees, employee positions, email addresses and phone numbers mentioned in the emails are all random. Some of these companies will exist and some won’t. Don’t try to respond by phone or email, all you will do is end up with an innocent person or company who have had their details spoofed and picked at random from a long list that the bad guys have previously found. The bad guys choose companies, Government departments and organisations with subjects that are designed to entice you or alarm you into blindly opening the attachment or clicking the link in the email to see what is happening.
Please read our How to protect yourselves page for simple, sensible advice on how to avoid being infected by this sort of socially engineered malware.
This is another one of the files that unless you have “show known file extensions enabled“, can easily be mistaken for a genuine DOC / PDF / JPG or other common file instead of the .EXE / .JS file it really is, so making it much more likely for you to accidentally open it and be infected.
Be very careful with email attachments. All of these emails use Social engineering tricks to persuade you to open the attachments that come with the email. Whether it is a message saying “look at this picture of me I took last night” and it appears to come from a friend or is more targeted at somebody who regularly is likely to receive PDF attachments or Word .doc attachments or any other common file that you use every day.
The basic rule is NEVER open any attachment to an email, unless you are expecting it. Now that is very easy to say but quite hard to put into practice, because we all get emails with files attached to them. Our friends and family love to send us pictures of them doing silly things, or even cute pictures of the children or pets.
Never just blindly click on the file in your email program. Always save the file to your downloads folder, so you can check it first. Many malicious files that are attached to emails will have a faked extension. That is the 3 letters at the end of the file name. Unfortunately windows by default hides the file extensions so you need to Set your folder options to “show known file types. Then when you unzip the zip file that is supposed to contain the pictures of “Sally’s dog catching a ball” or a report in word document format that work has supposedly sent you to finish working on at the weekend, or an invoice or order confirmation from some company, you can easily see if it is a picture or document & not a malicious program.
If you see JS or .EXE or .COM or .PIF or .SCR or .HTA .vbs, .wsf , .jse .jar at the end of the file name DO NOT click on it or try to open it, it will infect you.
While the malicious program is inside the zip file, it cannot harm you or automatically run. When it is just sitting unzipped in your downloads folder it won’t infect you, provided you don’t click it to run it. Just delete the zip and any extracted file and everything will be OK. You can always run a scan with your antivirus to be sure. There are some zip files that can be configured by the bad guys to automatically run the malware file when you double click the zip to extract the file. If you right click any suspicious zip file received, and select extract here or extract to folder ( after saving the zip to a folder on the computer) that risk is virtually eliminated. Never attempt to open a zip directly from your email, that is a guaranteed way to get infected. The best way is to just delete the unexpected zip and not risk any infection.
Main object- “Official_Purchase Order.iso”
Dropped executable file
sha256 C:\Users\admin\Desktop\Official_Purchase Order.exe